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A CONSERVATIVE LITERALIST - JUSTICE SCALIA'S LEGAL 
PHILOSOPHY AS SEEN THROUGH 
AUSTIN V. MICHIGAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND 
TEXAS V. JOHNSON 
BY 
WALTER E. JOYCE* 
Introduction 
save for the abortion issue, no case in recent 
years has caused such a public furor as Texas v. 
Johnson 105 L.Ed.2,342. There, of course, the Court 
said in an opinion by Justice Brennan that the State 
of Texas' interest in preventing breaches of the 
peace did not support its conviction of Johnson who 
burned the American flag as part of a peaceful 
political protest demonstration. The court concluded 
there was no threat to the peace of the community. 
In addition Brennan wrote: "Nor does the State's 
interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of 
nationhood and national unity justify his crimina l 
conviction for engaging in political expression". 
(105 L.Ed.2,364) 
The anger and hostility toward the Court 
expresse d by public officials, the acrimonious debate 
over whether a Constitutional amendment was needed 
to right such a "wrong decisionn, the passage of 
a federal statute prohibiting desecration of the 
national symbol, the anguished outcry by patriotic 
groups, and the confusion, exasperation and 
frustration expressed by ordinary citizens have just 
begun to subside, despite the recent decision 
declaring unconstitu\ional the new federal statute 
to ban "flagburning" , by the same majority of the 
Supreme Court and the defeat in the House of the 
proposed constitutional amendment. 
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This public outcry was accompanied by the 
astonishment of conservatives, liberals and 
professional court watchers at the makeup of the 
majority in both "flagburning" decisions. For there 
lo and behold were not only the new Justice Kennedy 
but Justice Antonin Scalia, joining Justl'ce William 
Brennan's majority opinion. The two Reagan appoi ntees 
had broken with the "conservative bloc" and had joined 
the "liberal" bloc's intellectual leader. Shock 
and dismay abounded, with particular attention given 
to Scalia. For here was a man called by some "worse 
than Bork"2 , and whose record seemed to support those 
who questioned his position on cases involving the 
Bill of Rights. 
This paper focuses on one recent case in the 
just completed term in an attempt to discover whether 
the Justice's position in Texas v. Johnson and the 
latest flagburning case are disparate from his 
jurisdictional bent. 
The Justice 
Although he has served but four terms, Scalia 
has already made an imprint on the court. An 
independent thinker, a man a a 
loner, an intellectual gadfly , a Just1ce pursu1ng 
his own consistent intellectual agenda, he is one 
" whose constitutional · theory and personal identity 
fuse. • • • the willing servant of a particular 
culturally induced interpretive world view and the 
carrier of lessons about what it means to approach 
the unruly world of constitutional 
though it were amenable to such control. 
In the 1988 term he wrote the fewest opinions 
for the Court <1fl but by all odds the most 
concurrences ( 23) His voting alignment patterns 
in the same term was predictable: 
Kennedy 85% 
Rehnquist 82% 
White 78% 
O'Connor 76% 
Stevens 59% 
Brennan 54% 
Marshall 54% 
Legislative history does not particularly concern 
141 
142 
him and precedent does not have the highest priority 
in statutory or constitutional interpretation. Rather 
he is a textualist, a positivist, a formalist who 
sees the text often independent of historical or 
contemporary context. Perhaps, as Kanmar has 
suggested, his scholastic training bas so moulded 
his intellectual apparatus that words themselves, 
logic, and verbal jousting, become central to his 
thought processes. 
"I adhere to the ·text where the text is clear. 
Where the text leaves room for interpretation I 
am guided in what it means by our societal 
traditions, not by a show of handg. Hey, maybe 
I don't like the result either." Thus Scalia, 
in First Amendment cases, looks at the text to arrive 
at its ·"plain meaning" and then interprets it in 
terms of traditional societal values rather than 
taking the "absolute" approach as did his great 
predecessor Hugo Black, whose constitutional world 
was rationalized and supported in terms of historical 
evidence to a greater extent than Scalia's. 
Both men are positivists and textualists but 
Black was content to rely on just the text. · Scalia 
on the other hand, despite his reliance on strict 
textual discipline, would depart from Black on issues 
like obscenity and cases involving national security, 
such as the Pentagon Papers case, and, if his record 
on the D.C. circuit is any indication, in libel cases 
as well. In other words, Justice Scalia is no civil 
libertarian. Nor is he a closet liberal in First 
Amendment speech issues. Rather as this analysis 
of the rece.nt case will point out, where there is 
no conflict with the text and his definition of 
traditional values and his coherent rational approach 
to the law, Scalia will go along with the text and 
let the chips fall where they may. 
Socioeconomic and political issues are 
irrelevant; the words and their implied values are 
determinative. Scalia exhibits neither the pragmatic 
skepticism of a Holmes nor the positive absolutism 
of a Black. He may come to the same conclusion as 
those legal giants but that result fits into a neat, 
logical system of jurisprudence and that system 
emphasizes the textual definition of value. Thus 
in the case to be discussed, the majority deals with 
such issues as corporate wealth, the interests of 
minority stockholders, the size of corporations, 
the impact of that economic power on political debate 
and how all this relates to a state statute limiting 
the amounts corporations may spend in political 
debate. True to his philosophy, Scalia treats all 
this as unimportant· to the issue of the meaning of 
the First Amendment in the particular case. Scalia 
considers merely the value and meaning of the First 
Amendment, not the realpolitique of the situation. 
The case 
To illustrate Justice Scalia's philosophy and 
constitutional approach on the speech clause of the 
First Amendment, this paper will the recent 
case in the 1989-90 term of Ausrin vs. Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce 108 L Ed. 2 652. There, Michigan 
p'rohibited a corporation from using its funds for 
independent expenditures in support of or in 
opposition to any candidate in election for state 
office. The statute defined an independent 
expenditure as one not made at the direction or under 
the control of another person, or to a committee 
working for or against a candidate. The law allowed 
corporations to make such independent expenditures 
from only segregated funds used solely for political 
purposes. The statute specifically exempted the 
media. The defendant in the case was a non-profit 
corporation whose membership consisted of both profit 
and non-profit corporations with the former 
constituting 75% of the membership. All members 
contributed annual dues. The Chamber of Commerce 
sought to use its general treasury for a newspaper 
advertisement in favor of a specific candidate for 
the Michigan House of Representatives. The Federal 
District Court held the statute valid under the First 
Amendment and under the equal protection clause of 
the 14th. However the Sixth Circuit reversed on 
these grounds: 
1. The Chamber was founded to disseminate 
economic and political ideas and it considered itself 
a non-traditional corporation. 
2. Its expenditures did not pose a threat or 
appearance of corruption. 
3. There was no compelling state interest 
justifying infringement of free speech. 
In an opinion by Justice Marshall the Supreme 
Court reversed. Marshall was joined by his usual 
confederates - Justices Brennan, Blackman and Stevens 
and in addition by two so called "conservative", 
members, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White. 
This unusual grouping shows the inherent danger of 
attempting to label justices as liberal or 
conservative and to predict voting patterns. 
Rehnqui st seldom, if ever, votes with the "liberal" 
143 
1.44 
wing on First Amendment issues 1 whil:e White, though more of a swing vote 1 tends to view issues very narrowly, including those cases involving the first 
amendment. So divided was the Court here that in 
addition to the dissenting opinion written by Justice 
Kennedy for himself and Justices O'Connor and Scalia1 
there were three concurring opinions by Brennan 1 
Stevens and Scalia. 
The Court's opinion noted that Michigan 
identified as a serious danger the significant 
possibility that corporate political expenditures 
could undermine the integrity of the political process 
and had implemented a narrowly tailored solution 
to that problem. "By requiring corporations to make 
all independent political expenditures through a 
separate fund made up of money solicited expressly 
for political purposes the statute reduces the threat 
that huge corporate treasuries amassed with the aid 
of favorable state laws will be gtsed to influence 
unfairly the outcome of elections." Thus the State 
through this statute allowed corporations to express 
their political vie\ITS while carefully eliminating 
the distortion that might be caused by corporate 
spending. The Court emphasized that the Act was 
.. precisely targeted" to eliminate what it considered 
to be a legitimate state interest, i.e., the danger 
to political discourse. The majority concluded that 
"although we agree that expression rights are 
implicated in this case we hold that the Act is 
Constitutional because the provision is 
tailored to serve a compelling state interest." 
Scalia's Dissent 
Justice Scalia disputed both the issues of a 
compelling state interest and the need to narrowly 
draw any limits on freedom of speech. The opinion 
is vintage Scalia combative, colorful, pungent, 
independent, argumentative, appealing to the textual 
literalness of the First Amendment, scornful of the 
majority's attempt to refine a limitation on free 
speech and unwilling to consider that it is in 
society's interest to promote "fair" political 
debate. . As is so often the case with dissenting 
and concurring opinions, there is a tendency to 
overstate ("Orwellian Censorship") since one is 
writing for oneself and appealing to a future day 
when the Court's opinion might be overruled. 
"I dissent", states Scalia 1 because "Government, cannot be trusted to assure 1 through censorship, the fairness of political debate. This is 
incompatible with the absolutely central truth of 
the first amendment • • • • • The object of the law we 
have approved today is 1root to prevent wrong doing but to prevent speech. 11 While not quoting Hugo 
Black or using Black's "absolute" approach Scalia 
comes very close to his position at least as far 
as political discourse in its rational form is 
cc:mcerned. ..The Michigan statute is incompatible 
w1th the 11 unrepealable wisdom of our First Amendment. 11 There is no such thing as too much 
speech. "A healthy democratic system can survive 
the legislative power to prescribe how much politiT21 
speech is too much, who may speak( and who may not." 
Yet he differs from Black since he accepts the 
compelling state interest test. And it is in this 
part of his opinion that he is particularly disdainful 
of the Court's analysis. Scalia simply sees no 
legitimate state interest. He sardonically questions 
the majority's argument of corporate wealth being 
used to corrupt the political process. Does one 
"think it would be lawful to prohibit men and women 
whose. net worth is above a ?f.ftain figure from 
endorsing political candidates'?" The mere fact 
of corporate wealth appears to be irrelevant to Scalia 
as far as First Amendment protection is concerned. 
"The advocacy of such entities •••• that have 'amassed 
great wealth' will be effective only to the extent 
that it brings to the people's attention ideas while 
- despite the invariably self-interested and probably 
uncongenial source - strike them as true ... 14 
The threat that the State of Michigan and the 
majority of the Court perceive in economic power 
having a negative impact on political debate is simply 
not supported by the philosophy of the First 
Amendment. Scalia is saying that the mere wealth 
of the speaker be it individual or corporation, is 
no basis for the compelling state interest test. 
"It is rudimentary that the state cannot exact as 
the price of special advantage (the corporate 1 the forfeiture of First Amendment rights." As 
to the .question of whether corporations could 
"corrode" the political process by their use of funds, 
the Justice accuses the Court of equating corruption 
with unpopularity, with fear of the potential wrong 
to American society from powerful economic units 
taking direct part in the political debate ••••• 
For the first time since Justice Holmes left the 
bench 1 the court holds that a direct restriction upon speech is narrowly enough tailored if it extends 
to speech has the mere potential for producing 
social harm." Speech operates in a competitive 
setting and in this free-for-all environment, values 
and ideas which survive have passed a severe test. 
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Fairness, or merit, or equity are not necessarily 
part of the rules. There seems to be no difference 
between the weal thy individual and the modern 
corporation. Nor is there an assumption that wealth 
in and of i tself should be considered as adversely 
affecting political debate. If wealth equals power 
so be it. That is part · of our free system of 
government. "Under the court's analysis of corruption 
by immense aggregation of wealth virtually any thing 
the court dee ms politically undesirable can be turned 
into political corruption by simply describing 
its effects as politically "corrosive" which is close 
enough to corruption to qualify. It is sad to think 
that the First Amendment will ultimately be 
down not by brute force but by poetic metaphor." 
It is anathema to Scalia to calibrate political 
speech to the degree of public opinion that supports 
it. What particularly annoyed Scalia was the general 
prohibition of corporate free speech activity by 
Michigan a nd not merely limiting independent 
expenditures above a certain amount or some other 
specific guide lines as long as the guidelines were 
reasonable and content neutral. As an example, in 
the case of Ward v Rock 105 L.Ed.2, 661, Scalia joined 
the maj ority which held that New York City's law 
requiring sponsors of park bandshell concerts to 
use sound amplification equipment and sound 
technicians provided by the City was valid under 
t he F i rst Amendment as a reasonable regulation of 
place and manner of speech. The Michigan statute 
was not reasonable, was not narrowly tailored, because 
its rationale was the economic power of speech and 
thus it was aimed at the thought and content itself. 
conclusion 
Scalia's position in Johnson and Eichman, appears 
to be consistent with his overall philosophy of 
constitutional interpretation. Once he acepted flag 
burning as expressive conduct, once he determi ned 
that there was no breach Of the peace, Scalia sough t 
the text and found protection for Johnson and Eichman. 
While the e mphasis in Austin was on speech in its 
traditional sense (rational political discourse), 
Scalia was able to make the leap to find the extreme 
conduct of flag burning minus concurrent violence, 
as political expression and, thus protected. As 
abhorrent as the act was the Constitution shields 
it from attack by the State. 
i" 
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